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a b  s  t  r a  c t
Transitioning away  from our current  global  energy  system is  of paramount  importance. The  speed  at
which  a transition  can take place—its  timing,  or  temporal  dynamics—is  a  critical  element of considera-
tion.  This study  therefore  investigates  the  issue of time  in global  and  national  energy  transitions by  asking:
What  does the  mainstream  academic  literature suggest  about the  time  scale  of energy transitions? Addi-
tionally, what does some  of the  more recent  empirical  data  related  to  transitions  say, or  challenge,  about
conventional  views?  In  answering  these  questions,  the  article presents  a “mainstream”  view of  energy
transitions  as  long, protracted affairs, often  taking decades  to  centuries to occur.  However,  the  article  then
offers some empirical  evidence that the  predominant  view  of timing may  not  always be  supported  by
the  evidence.  With  this  in mind, the  final  part  of  the  article  argues  for  more transparent  conceptions  and
definitions of energy transitions, and  it asks for  analysis  that recognizes the  causal complexity underlying
them.
©  2015  The Author. Published by  Elsevier Ltd.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Transitioning away from our  current global energy system is  of
paramount importance [1].  As  Grubler compellingly writes, “the
need for the ‘next’ energy transition is  widely apparent as current
energy systems are simply unsustainable on all accounts of social,
economic, and environmental criteria [2]”. And as Miller et al. add,
“the future of energy systems is  one of the central policy challenges
facing industrial countries [3]”. Unfortunately, however, neither
private markets nor government agencies seem likely to spur a
transition on their own [4]. Moreover, transitions to newer, cleaner
energy systems such as sources of renewable electricity [5,6] or
electric vehicles [7,8] often require significant shifts not only in
technology, but in  political regulations, tariffs and pricing regimes,
and the behavior of users and adopters.
The speed at which a  transition can take place—its timing, or
temporal dynamics—is a vital element of consideration. According
to the International Energy Agency, for example, if “action to  reduce
CO2 emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emis-
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sions would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that
time [9]”. In other words, if  a  transition does not occur quickly, or
soon, it may  be too late. Giddens went so far as to  call this the “cli-
mate paradox”, the fact that by the time humanity may  come to
fully realize how much they need to shift to low-carbon forms of
energy, they will have already passed the point of no return [10].
This study, therefore, investigates the critical issue of  time in
global and national energy transitions. Although other elements of
transitions such as their scale, magnitude, direction, drivers, actors,
and mechanisms are touched upon when exploring this theme,
the article’s central purpose is  to ask:  What does the mainstream
academic literature suggest about the time scale of energy transi-
tions? In addition, what does some of the more recent empirical
data related to transitions say, or challenge, about the mainstream
view?
In answering these questions, the article proceeds as follows. It
begins by presenting a  mainstream view of energy transitions as
long, protracted affairs, often taking decades to centuries to  occur.
Part of this argument draws from the history of previous major
energy transitions such as the switch from wood to coal or coal to
oil. Part of this argument also draws on the sheer scale and com-
plexity involved in major transitions, as well as the tendency for
new systems to  face the “lock-in” or “path dependency” of existing
systems. However, the article then offers some empirical evidence
that the predominant view of timing may  not always be supported
by the evidence. The second half of the paper shows that there have
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.020
2214-6296/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.  This  is  an  open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table  1
Five definitions of energy transitions.
Definition Source
A change in fuels (e.g., from wood to coal or
coal to oil) and their associated technologies
(e.g., from steam engines to  internal
combustion engines)
Hirsh and Jones [22]
Shifts in the fuel source for energy production
and  the technologies used to  exploit that fuel
Miller et al. [23]
A particularly significant set of changes to the
patterns of energy use in a society, potentially
affecting resources, carriers, converters, and
services
O’Connor [24]
The switch from an  economic system
dependent on one or a series of energy sources
and technologies to another
Fouquet and Pearson [25]
The time that elapses between the
introduction of a new primary energy source,
or prime mover, and its rise to  claiming a
substantial share of the overall market
Smil [26]
been many transitions—at varying scales and sectors—that have
occurred quite quickly—that is, between a few years and a  decade
or so, or within a single generation. At smaller scales, the adoption
of cookstoves, air conditioners, and flex-fuel vehicles are excellent
examples. At the state or national scale, almost complete transitions
to oil and electricity in Kuwait, natural gas in  the Netherlands, and
nuclear electricity in France took only a decade, roughly, to  occur.
This part of the article presents ten case studies of energy tran-
sitions that, in aggregate, affected almost one billion people and
needed only 1–16 years to unfold. Clearly, this evidence suggests
that some energy transitions can occur much more quickly than
commonly believed.
2. Energy transitions: conceptualizations from the
literature
This section of the article presents a  “mainstream” view of
energy transitions drawn mostly from the academic and policy lit-
erature about transitions. It introduces definitions and statements
about the timing behind transitions and discusses how the histori-
cal record confirms these conceptualizations. It  also illustrates the
complexity, phases, and path dependent nature of energy transi-
tions.
2.1. Definitions, timing, and contextual specificity
As Table 1 reveals, although there is  no standard or commonly
accepted definition of an energy transition in  the recent academic
literature, there is  a  common theme within them. An energy transi-
tion most broadly involves a  change in an energy system, usually to
a particular fuel source, technology, or prime mover (a device that
converts energy into useful services, such as an automobile or tele-
vision) [11–14]. Some studies choose to focus only on the first of
those dimensions—fuels such as oil, coal, gas, and uranium—causing
some to critique that they narrowly frame transitions as a  way  of
foreclosing future change [15] or of masking “the social and politi-
cal dimensions of energy systems behind a false veneer of limited
technological choices [16]”. Others take a broader view that encom-
passes shifts in  technology as well as the resulting “constellation
of energy inputs and outputs involving suppliers, distributors, and
end users along with institutions of regulation, conversion and
trade [17]”, or structural changes in  the way energy services are
delivered. Still others argue that  the term “energy transition” is
meant to be similar to energy “transformation” or  “revolution”, a
disruptive or radical transformation of both  technology and social
practices [18–20],  often centered on expanding access to  energy,
or abundance, but occasionally focused on scarcity [21].
Transitions, perhaps obviously, must be measured over time,
usually from the point at which an energy system or technology
occupies a  1%  market share and then grows or  shrinks accordingly.
As Melosi puts it, “The concept of ‘energy transitions’ is  based on
the notion that a single energy source, or group of related sources,
dominated the market during a  particular period or era, eventu-
ally to  be challenged and then replaced by another major source
or sources [18]”. Smil even puts a definitive threshold to his def-
inition, arguing that an energy transition refers to the time that
elapses between the introduction of a new fuel or prime mover”
and its rise to 25% of national or global market share [26].  So does
Grubler, who argues that “grand transitions” can occur when they
reach 50% of a  market [27].
Complicating matters, in some circumstances what may  seem
a  sweeping transition or radical transformation can actually be a
bundle of more discrete conversions. As O’Connor concludes, “Big
transitions are the sum of many small ones. Looking at overall
energy consumption will miss the small-scale changes that are the
foundation of the transitions [28]”. The big ascent of oil at the start
of the previous century, for example, can also be interpreted as a
series of less grand changes involving:
• The switch from animal power to  internal combustion engines
for private vehicles, and the social rejection of electric vehicles
[29];
• The conversion of steam engines on ships and locomotives to
diesel for marine vessels and trains [30];
• The shift from candles and kerosene for lighting to oil  based lamps
[31];
• The adaptation of coal boilers to  oil boilers for the generation of
electric power [32];
• The exchange of wooden fireplaces and coal stoves to  oil and gas
furnaces in homes [33].
Similarly, a transition in the United States to  air  conditioning,
explored in greater detail below, was actually the result of  concur-
rent innovations in air circulation, heat exchangers, heat pumps,
halocarbon refrigerants, customization and mass production, and
marketing [34].  It  is occasionally these “minor transitions” that,
when they occur in  a concerted manner, create the “major transi-
tions” that  are so easily identifiable.
Sometimes, however, measuring a  transition is  more compli-
cated than it may  seem. An energy system can grow rapidly in an
absolute sense but still fail to grow in  a comparative sense. Hydro-
electricity in the United States was a low-cost source of energy
in the 1950s and 1960s, where it grew in  capacity threefold from
1949 to  1964. However, during this time, because other sources
of energy (and demand for electricity) grew faster, hydropower’s
overall national share dropped from 32% to  16%. Similarly, from
2000 to 2010, global annual investment in solar PV increased by
a factor of 16, investment in wind grew fourfold, investment in
solar heating threefold. This sounds impressive—yet the overall
contribution of solar (heating and PV) and wind to total global final
energy consumption grew from less than one-tenth of one percent
to  slightly less than 1% over the same period [35,36],  a  proverbial
drop in the bucket.
In  other situations, the rise of an energy system may  depend, or
be mutually dependent on, another—meaning it can be a  mistake to
identify or analyze a single energy system or technology by  itself.
Occasionally, two  shifts have to  occur to  result in  one combined
effect, since the one tends to require in tandem the adoption of the
other. As Fig. 1 illustrates, Grubler found this to  be the case with
technologies such as the railway and the telegraph as well as the
road network for automobiles and oil pipelines [37].
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Fig. 1. Growth of Infrastructures in the United States as a  Percentage of their Maximum Network Size.
Source: Ref. [38]
Table 2
The differences in timing and speed of energy transitions in Europe.
Phase-out traditional
renewables phase-in coal:
Diffusion
midpoint
Diffusion
speed
Core England 1736 160
Rim Germany 1857 102
France  1870 107
Netherlands 1873 105
Periphery Spain 1919 111
Sweden 1922 96
Italy 1919 98
Portugal 1949 135
Phase-out coal phase-in oil/gas/electricity:
Core Portugal 1966 47
Italy 1960 65
Sweden 1963 67
Rim Spain 1975 69
Netherlands 1962 62
France  1972 65
Periphery Germany 1984 50
England 1979 67
Source: Ref. [39]
2.2. Phases, path dependency, lock-in and subversion
The mainstream literature on energy transitions has also
advanced a number of interrelated concepts that are helpful in
understanding why transitions are  expected to take so much time.
One of them is the notion of “phases”. Grubler has posited that
major European energy transitions since 1800 all went through
phases of having a core or innovation center, where that innova-
tion began, moving upward to  early adopters (what he called the
rim) to, lastly, the late adopters, which he classified as the periph-
ery [39]. His data suggests that  the time it took to transition from
pre-industrial biomass (“traditional renewables”) to coal—the time
needed for coal to  pass through all three phases of core, rim, and
periphery—ranged from 96 to  160 years, as Table 2 reveals. The
shift again from coal to  oil and electricity was more rapid, but it still
ranged from 47 to  69 years for those technologies to pass through
the three phases.
During these transitions, two things are  of note. One is  that
a tension existed between early and late adopters, with each of
them confronting separate sets of advantages and risks. The idea
here is that transition or technology adoption will rarely be uni-
form, and will occur in fits and starts—leading to inconstant rates
of change. Another is that transitions can involve at times not neces-
sarily “going towards” something but instead “moving away” from
it. Or, as Grubler remarked, history in  Europe reveals a  pattern of
“first in, last out; and last in,  first out” with respect to the lifecycle
of related energy technologies and systems. That is, sometimes late
adopters stick with the technology even past its point of competive-
ness or attractiveness—taking a  longer time. In other situations,
early adopters overinvest in a technology and get stuck, finding it
difficult to get out compared to  latecomers.
Further complicating matters, Grubler hypothesized another
number of factors that can complicate—and thus extend—the time
needed for a transition to occur [37]. One is  that  no innovation
spreads simultaneously, instead all undergo a typical S  shaped tem-
poral pattern that  takes months, years, or  even decades to  occur.
One is  that diffusion is  a  spatial as well as temporal phenomenon,
meaning that it will take time for an innovation or new system to
transit from the center to  the periphery. One is  that the density of
adoption will differ based on a  variety of contextual factors, mak-
ing adoption a  process of “clusters and lumps” rather than a  straight
line.
Drawing from Grubler’s work, Wilson presented a  conceptual-
ization of phases in his analysis of successful “scaling-up” exercises
for various prime movers and types of energy equipment such as
wind turbines, solar panels, automobiles, oil  refineries, and natural
gas power plants [40].  Across these various types of energy systems,
he concluded that four phases must occur in  order:
• An extended period of experimentation and learning with small
unit-scale technologies and a diversity of designs, with industry
scale being generally small and diverse;
• Scaling-up at the unit level as designs are improved and
economies of scale begin to emerge;
• Scaling up  at the industry level, epitomized by the phrase “sell
many, and large units in  core markets” as well as a “crowding
out” of smaller competitors;
• As industry structure becomes standardized and core markets
become saturated, further industry growth is driven by  global-
ization, the diffusion of a  successful design from the innovation
core to rim and periphery markets.
In sum: each of these individual phases requires require
substantial time and are sequential rather than simultaneous,
explaining thus the many decades-long pace under which energy
transitions unfold [41].
Using a  different approach, in  his  historical work Networks of
Power [42] Hughes explored the evolution of the small intercity
lighting systems of the 1880s into the regional power systems
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of  the 1920s. Drawing heavily from a non-engineering approach
to systems theory, Hughes argued that the electric utility sys-
tem –  like all large technical systems – progressed through five
other types of phases, each one taking a meaningful amount of
time [43].1 First came invention and development, where inventor-
entrepreneurs invented a  product and enrolled engineers and
financers to their project. Second came technology transfer, where
successful technologies were exported between societies. Third
came system growth, where reverse salients were solved and the
system operators managed challenges. Fourth came momentum,
where the system acquired velocity. Fifth came style, where the
system operators became particularly adept at solving problems
in their own  way,  creating technological differentiation. In his
later work, Hughes elaborated that the process took a  long time
(decades) and also that it tended to create a path dependency
that resists change. The “momentum” of a  given system referred
to  the machines, structures, and physical artifacts where capital
had been invested in a  technology; the persons whose professional
skills were attached, trained, and associated with a technology; and
the business interests and political concerns connected to a  large-
scale sociotechnical system. Taken together, these elements form
the system’s rate of growth, which often accelerates. Put another
way, large sums of labor, capital, and effort are  “sunk” into existing
socio-technical systems so that they create their own “inertia” [44]
or “lock-in” which highly resist change [45]. As Lund notes, “the
inertia of energy systems against changes is  large, among others
because of the long investment cycles of energy infrastructures or
production plants [46]”.
An additional factor contributing to path dependence can be the
strategic capture, cooption, or “subversion” of a  new energy sys-
tem or idea. Byrne and Rich propose that rather than sit idly by and
accept a new innovation, many incumbent actors will try to con-
tain or coopt it [47]. That is,  they will concede the need for change
but then attempt to  direct resources or capital back into their own
energy systems. One particularly pernicious practice is the suppres-
sion of patents, where some energy companies actively suppress
new and innovative technologies that  threaten to disrupt profits
in a market [48–51].  Stirling also argues that energy transforma-
tions can become subverted by dominant interests—who attempt
to  capture the drivers or discourses behind them with options that
will directly benefit them, with shale gas, carbon capture and stor-
age, nuclear power, and climate change geoengineering serving as
examples [52,53].
In order to counteract path dependence, inertia, and lock-in,
scholars looking at transitions theory have argued that truly trans-
formative change must be the result of alterations at every level
of the system simultaneously. That is, one must alter technologies,
political and legal regulations, economies of scale and price signals,
and social attitudes and values together. A widely cited theoret-
ical manifestation of these ideas is encapsulated in  a framework
known as the “multilevel perspective” on socio-technical transi-
tions and innovation [54–58]. This suggests that transitions occur
through interactions between three levels: the niche, the regime,
and the landscape. The idea is that that niche-innovations often face
uphill struggles against existing systems. The “landscape” refers to
exogenous developments or shocks (e.g. economic crises, demo-
graphic changes, wars, ideological change, major environmental
disruption like climate change) that create pressures on the regime,
which in turn create windows of opportunity for the diffusion of
niche-innovations.
1 These five are modified into “seven” stages in Hughes later work. He split “inven-
tion” and “development” into separate phases and also added one on “innovation”
after  “development” and before “style.”
A key term of art within the framework is  that of  a “transi-
tion pathway”. Analytically, the claim is  that different kinds of
interactions between niche, regime and landscape result in  differ-
ent kinds of alignments. Geels and Schot constructed a typology
based on combinations between two  dimensions: the timing and
nature of multi-level interactions [59]. This led them to distinguish
four transition pathways: (1) technological substitution, based
on disruptive niche-innovations which are sufficiently developed
when landscape pressure occurs, (2) transformation, in which land-
scape pressures stimulate incumbent actors to gradually adjust
the regime, when niche-innovations are not sufficiently devel-
oped, (3) reconfiguration, based on symbiotic niche-innovations
that are incorporated into the regime and trigger further (archi-
tectural) adjustments under landscape pressure, (4) de-alignment
and re-alignment, in which major landscape pressures destabilize
the regime when niche-innovations are insufficiently developed;
the prolonged co-existence of niche-innovations is followed by  re-
creation of a new regime around one of them. The implication is
that transitions are  competitive – many niches fail – and that exist-
ing energy systems and infrastructure can dominate and suppress
threatening innovations.
Indeed, the idea that energy transitions will take a  substantial
amount of time is embedded in  no less than four major academic
theories or approaches—each with their different foci, units of
analysis, and concepts—shown in  Table 3, including the multilevel
perspective as well as three others from the disciplines of envi-
ronmental science, sociology, and political ecology. Socio-technical
transitions scholars focus on how to counteract the momentum
or domination of existing systems [60,61]; ecological modernists
highlight the lengthy process of regulatory reform [62–64]; soci-
ologists underscore how altering everyday routines and practices
can take a  generation [65–69]; political ecologists proclaim how
neo-liberal ideology has further entrenched capitalism into our
social and political spaces so that alternatives are rarely imag-
ined let  alone implemented [70–74].  The end result is  that energy
transitions, breaking out of these embedded systems, require a
“long-term transformation” that is  “a messy, conflictual, and highly
disjointed process [75]”.
2.3. Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of historical
transitions
Independent of these theories and concepts, the historical
record does seemingly support the mainstream view that energy
transitions all take time. In the United States crude oil took half a
century from its exploratory stages in  the 1860s to capturing 10% of
the national market in the 1910s, then 30 years more to reach 25%.
Natural gas took 70 years to rise from 1% to 20% in the United States.
Coal needed 103 years to account for just 5% of total energy con-
sumed in the United States and an additional 26 years to  reach 25%
[77].  Nuclear electricity took 38 years to  reach a 20% share in the
United States, which occurred in 1995. As  Smil points out, “It’s taken
between 50 and 70 years for a  resource to reach a  large penetration.
When you look at the money, the infrastructure, the regulation, the
technologies, it takes many decades for any fuel source to  make a
large impact [78]”.
At  the global scale, we see even longer timeframes involved with
energy transitions, illustrated by Fig. 2.  Coal surpassed the 25% mark
in 1871, more than five hundred years after the first commercial
coalmines were developed in England. Crude oil surpassed the same
mark in  1953, about nine decades after Edwin Drake drilled the first
commercial well in  Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859. Hydroelectric-
ity, natural gas, nuclear power, and “other” sources such as wind
turbines and solar panels still have yet to  surpass the 25% threshold.
Assessing prime movers rather than fuels, Smil adds that steam
engines were designed in the 1770s, but did not take off until the
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Table  3
Four key conceptual approaches to understanding energy transitions.
Socio-technical transitions Ecological modernization
theory
Sociology and social
practice theory
Political ecology
Related academic
disciplines
Science and technology
studies, evolutionary
economics, structuration
theory
Environmental science,
environmental sociology,
policy studies
Sociology, anthropology,
cultural theory
Human geography,
ecology, political
geography
Primary  focus The development or
introduction of new
technologies leading to
new socio-technical
configurations
Environmental regulation,
reform, and governance
Everyday routines and
practices
Conflict over natural
resources and opposition
to change
Themes Transition pathways,
momentum, path
dependency, carbon
lock-in, resistance by
incumbents
Energy transitions,
environmental reform, risk
society, social movements
Changing practices, habits,
socialization,
normalization
Contestation, enclosure
and exclusion,
accumulation by
dispossession, global
production networks,
neoliberalism
Units of analysis Socio-technical systems,
niches, regimes, and
landscapes
Sectors, industries,
institutions
Everyday practices or
discourses
Ecological change, local
communities, institutions
Selected key authors Frank Geels, Johan Schot,
Arie Rip, Frans Berkhout,
René Kemp, Wim A.  Smit,
Thomas Hughes
Ulrich Beck, Maarten Hajer,
APJ Mol, FH Buttel, Richard
York, Martin Jaenicke
Elizabeth Shove, Gordon
Walker, Loren Lutzenhiser,
Harold Wilhite
David Harvey, Michael
Watts, Paul Robbins, James
McCarthy, Gavin Bridge
Source: Modified from Ref. [76,171]
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Fig. 2. Global Energy Supply by Fuel Source as a% of the  Total, 1830–2010.
Note “Wood/Biomass” includes biofuels, and “Other” includes renewable sources of energy such as wind, solar, and geothermal.
Source: Modified from Refs. [79–81]
1800s, and the gasoline powered internal combustion engine, first
deployed by Benz, Maybach, and Daimler in the middle of the 1880s,
reached widespread acceptance in  the United States only in the
1920s, even later for Europe and Japan. As Smil deduces from these
examples, which tend to refer to  large nations with high per capita
energy use:
Energy transitions have been, and will continue to be, inherently
prolonged affairs, particularly so in large nations whose high levels
of per capita energy use and whose massive and expensive infras-
tructures make it impossible to greatly accelerate their progress
even if we were to resort to some highly effective interventions...
[81].
This is why he  calls energy systems “a  slow-maturing resource”
and jokes that “energy sources, they grow up so . . . slowly [77]”.
Analogously, Fouquet studied various transitions between both
energy fuels and energy services from 1500 to  1920, and found
that, on average, each single transition had an innovation phase
exceeding 100 years followed by a  diffusion phase approaching 50
years [82].
The argument that  historical energy transitions are inherently
lengthy events finds further support from energy analysts looking
at the innovation or diffusion of prime movers or  specific technolo-
gies. Lund, looking at prime movers, found that market penetration
of new energy systems or technologies can take as long as 70 years
[83].  Short “take-over times” of less than 25 years are  limited to
a few end-use technologies such as water heaters or refrigerators,
and are not common for major infrastructural systems like those
involving electricity or transport. Edmonds testified to  U.S. senators
that:
Given that it takes decades to go from “energy research” to the prac-
tical application of the research within some commercial “energy
technology” and then perhaps another three to four decades before
that technology is widely deployed throughout the global energy
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market, we will likely have to [combat global warming] with tech-
nologies that are already developed [84].
Gorte and Kaarsberg also remark that research and development
on energy technologies “usually takes years to pay off  . . . the piper
is paid five, ten, or more years in the future [85]”.
Thus, when many scholars conceptualize the temporal dynam-
ics of a historical or even future transition, they presume that shifts
and changes will take many, many years, since so many discrete
alterations need to accumulate and align. As Smil remarks, “it is
impossible to  displace [the world’s fossil-fuel-based energy] super-
system in a decade or two—or five, for that matter. Replacing it with
an equally extensive and reliable alternative based on renewable
energy flows is a  task that  will require decades of expensive com-
mitment. It is the work of generations of engineers [77]”. In another
article, Smil writes that “all energy transitions have one thing in
common: They are prolonged affairs that take decades to  accom-
plish, and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and conversions,
the longer the substitutions will take [86]”. One review of fourteen
historical transitions concluded that “the process from technolog-
ical innovation to  niche market to dominance took a minimum of
40 years” for single systems and that “an aggregate energy transi-
tion, involving the entire economy, could take centuries [87]”. As
Grubler echoed in his  review of the literature, “The fact that his-
torical energy transitions have taken many decades, even above a
century to unfold is a by  now widely shared insight [88]”. Fouquet
and Perason opine that energy transitions “have in  the past tended
to be relatively rare events whose complex and long drawn-out
processes unfolded over decades and sometimes centuries [89]”.
The Global Energy Assessment, a  major international, interdisci-
plinary effort to  better understand energy systems in 2012, notes
that “transformations in energy systems” are “long-term change
processes” on the scale of decades or even centuries [90].  This view
holds that, as two Stanford University scientists write, “it appears
that there is no quick fix; energy system transitions are intrinsically
slow [91]”. Grubb et al. [92] Allen [93],  and Rubio and Folchi [94]
also each argue that energy transitions are gradual and sluggish
processes that take upwards of 75 or even 130 years to  occur. Fast
transitions, when they occur at all, are considered anomalies, lim-
ited to countries with very small populations or unique contextual
circumstances that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
3. The timing of energy transitions: conflicting evidence
Contrary to the legitimate reasons and arguments presented in
favor of the longevity of energy transitions, some empirical data
suggests that under certain conditions, they can occur rather speed-
ily. This data tends to support three arguments in  favor of rapid
transition: (1) we have seen fast transitions in  terms of energy
end-use and prime movers, (2) examples of rapid national-scale
transitions in energy supply do  populate the historical record, (3)
the drivers of future transitions may  differ fundamentally from
the drivers of historical transitions; we  can sufficiently learn from
previous trends so that favorable future energy transitions can be
expedited.
The first part of this section of the article explores no less than
ten “quick” energy transitions – broadly defined – five of them
focused on end-use devices such as lighting and air conditioning,
five of them focused on national energy, electricity, or heating sys-
tems such as oil and electricity in  Kuwait, cogeneration in Denmark,
and nuclear power in France. Table 4 provides an overview of these
cases, which collectively impacted more than 967 million people.
As Araujo writes, “countries can, in fact, alter their energy balance
in a significant way – stressing low carbon energy sources – in
much less time than many decision-makers might imagine. Critical
substitution shifts within [Brazil, France, Denmark, and Iceland]
Fig. 3. Market Change and Market Share of Energy-Efficient Ballasts in Sweden,
1986–2000.
Source:  Ref. [98]
were accomplished often in  less than 15 years. Moreover, these
transitions were effectuated even amidst circumstances at times
involving highly complex energy technologies [95]”.
3.1. Rapid transitions in prime movers
At  least five transitions in  end-use devices, or  prime movers,
have occurred with remarkable rapidity: lighting in Sweden, cook-
stoves in China, liquefied petroleum gas stoves in  Indonesia,
ethanol vehicles in Brazil, and air  conditioning in  the United States.
Sweden was able to phase in  an almost complete shift to energy
efficient lighting in commercial buildings in about 9 years. Swedish
Energy Authorities arranged for the procurement of high-frequency
electronic ballasts for lights in office buildings, commercial enter-
prises, schools, and hospitals, which saved 30–70% compared to
ordinary ballasts, in  1991 [96].  They used a multi-pronged approach
of standardization and quality assurance, direct procurement,
stakeholder involvement, and demonstrations to  disseminate those
ballasts. They began by collaborating with experts to develop a
list of lighting quality factors for commercial buildings, and then
asked for competitive tenders from manufacturers that met  these
standards. Then, the government directly purchased almost 30,000
units in a  pilot phase, and worked with real estate management
companies (for new buildings) and owners of public, commer-
cial and industrial buildings (for retrofits) to ensure that they
were installed [97]. After the pilot phase, they promoted distri-
bution through government subsidies, sponsored demonstrations
of the technology among the commercial sector, and involved con-
sumer groups in discounted bulk purchases. Due to  these concerted
efforts, self-supporting volume effects were reached as early as
1996, catalyzing very rapid market penetration which jumped from
about 10% that year to almost 70% by 2000 (the last year Lund
analyzed)—growth exhibited by Fig. 3 . In  essence, this meant that
between 1991 and 2000, 2.3 million Swedish workers experienced
changes in the lights at their offices.
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture sponsored an even more
impressive National Improved Stove Program (NISP), managed
by  the Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy (BEPE),
from 1983 to 1998 [99,100].  The BEPE adopted a  “self-building,
self-managing, self-using” policy focused on having rural people
themselves invent, distribute, and care for energy-efficient cook-
stoves, and it set up  pilot programs in hundreds of rural provinces.
From the start of the program until 1998, the NISP was responsible
for the installation of 185 million improved cookstoves and facili-
tated the penetration of improved stoves from less than one 1% of
the Chinese market in 1982 to more than 80% by 1998—reaching
half a  billion people, as Table 5 shows. The cookstoves being
installed in China in  1994, during the height of the program,
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Table  4
Overview of rapid energy transitions.
Country Technology/fuel Market or sector Period of transition Number of years from
1  to  25% market share
Approximate size (population
affected in millions of people)
Sweden Energy-efficient ballasts Commercial buildings 1991–2000 7 2.3
China Improved cookstoves Rural households 1983–1998 8 592
Indonesia Liquefied petroleum gas stoves Urban and rural
households
2007–2010 3 216
Brazil Flex-fuel vehicles New automobile sales 2004–2009 1 2
United States Air conditioning Urban and rural
households
1947–1970 16  52.8
Kuwait Crude oil and electricity National energy supply 1946–1955 2 0.28
Netherlands Natural gas National energy supply 1959–1971 10 11.5
France Nuclear electricity Electricity 1974–1982 11  72.8
Denmark Combined heat and power Electricity and heating 1976–1981 3 5.1
Canada
(Ontario)a
Coal Electricity 2003–2014 11  13
a The Ontario case study is  the inverse, showing how quickly a  province went from 25% coal supply to  zero.
Table 5
Households adopting improved stoves under the Chinese NISP and affiliated provincial programs.
NISP households (million) Households under provincial programs (million) Total households/year (million) Total people/year (million)
1983 2.6  4 6.6 21.1
1984  11 9.7 20.7 66.2
1985  8.4  9.5 17.9 57.3
1986  9.9  8.5 18.4 58.9
1987  8.9  9.1 18 57.6
1988  10 7.5 17.5 56
1989  4.5 5 9.5 30.4
1990  3.6  7.8 11.4 36.5
1991–1998 7.8  57.2 65 208
Total  66.7 118.3 185 592
Source: Ref. [100]
were equivalent to 90% of all improved stoves installed globally.
As a consequence, although substitution was never complete—all
existing inefficient cookstoves were never replaced, just most of
them—Chinese energy use per capita declined in  rural areas at an
annual rate of savings of 5.6% from 1983 to  1990.
Indonesia also ran a large household energy program focusing
on the conversion from kerosene stoves to liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) stoves to improve air  quality. Under leadership from
their Vice President Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian “LPG Megapro-
ject” offered households the right to  receive a  free “initial package”
consisting of a 3 kg  LPG cylinder, a  first free gas-fill, one burner
stove, a hose, and a  regulator. The government, in tandem, low-
ered kerosene subsidies (increasing its price) and constructed new
refrigerated LPG terminals to act as national distribution hubs.
Amazingly, in just 3 years – from 2007 to 2009 – the number of LPG
stoves nationwide jumped from a  mere 3 million to 43.3 million,
meaning they served almost two-thirds of Indonesia’s 65 million
households (or about 216 million people). Six entire provinces,
including that of Jakarta, the capital, were declared “closed and
dry”, meaning that the program reached all of its targets, and that
all kerosene subsidies were withdrawn [101].
Brazil has perhaps the fastest energy transition on record,
though (to be fair) it depends on what one counts. Brazil created its
Proálcool program in  November 1975 to increase ethanol produc-
tion and substitute ethanol for petroleum in  conventional vehicles,
and in 1981, six years later, 90% of all new vehicles sold in  Brazil
could run on ethanol—an impressive feat. However, a more recent
transition, connected in  part to the Proálcool program, is even more
noteworthy. The Brazilian government started incentivizing flex-
fuel vehicles (FFVs) in  2003 through reduced tax rates and fuel
taxes. These Brazilian FFVs were capable of running on any blend
of ethanol from 0 to 100%, giving drivers the option of switching
between various blends of gasoline and ethanol depending on price
and convenience. The first year FFVs entered the market in 2004
Fig. 4. Flex-Fuel Vehicle Sales as a  Percentage of Overall New Car Sales in Brazil,
2004–2009.
Source: Modified from Ref. [102]
they accounted for 17% of new car sales but they rapidly jumped
to 90% in  2009—as Fig. 4 illustrates—meaning 2 million FFVs were
purchased in total over the first five years of the program [102].
Air conditioning in the United States is a  final example. In
1947, mass-produced, low-cost window air conditioners became
possible, enabling many people to enjoy air conditioning without
the need to  buy a new home or completely renovate their heat-
ing system [103].  That year, only 43,000 units were sold, but by
1953 the number had jumped to  one million, as air conditioners
became endorsed by builders eager to  mass produce affordable,
yet desirable, modern homes and electric utilities that wanted to
increase electricity consumption throughout the growing suburbs
[104].  Consequently, more than 12% of people (occupying 6.5  mil-
lion housing units) reported to  the U.S. Census in  1960 that they
owned an air conditioner, rising to  25% in 1963 and 35.8% in 1970,
representing 24.2 million homes and more than 50 million people
[105,106].  Since then, the presence of air conditioning in  single-
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family homes jumped from 49% in 1973 to 87% in 2009 [107]. In
hot and humid places such as Southern Florida, its use grew from
five percent in 1950 to 95% in  1990. American motorists also use up
7–10 billion gallons of gasoline annually to air  condition their cars.
In aggregate, the United States on an annual basis now consumes
more electricity for air conditioning than the entire continent of
Africa consumes for all electricity uses [108]. Or, in  other terms,
the United States currently utilizes more energy (about 185 billion
kWh) for air-conditioning than all other countries’ air  conditioning
usage combined [109].
3.2. Rapid transitions in energy supply
Empirical data also points to five other transitions in supply that
have occurred at the national level: to crude oil and electricity in
Kuwait, natural gas in the Netherlands, nuclear electricity in France,
combined heat and power in Denmark, and coal retirements in
Ontario, Canada.
Two concurrent modifications, in electricity and transport, cat-
alyzed an almost complete shift in  Kuwait’s national energy profile
in about 9 years. Oil use catapulted from constituting a  negligi-
ble amount of total national energy supply in  1946 to  25% in  1947
and above 90% in 1950 [110].  In 1938, when Kuwait was still a
small, impoverished British protectorate, geologists discovered the
Burgan oilfield, which proved to be  the world’s second largest accu-
mulation of oil following Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar oil field [111].
Commercial exploitation began in  earnest in  1946 after a  suspen-
sion of operations due to World War  II, increasing from 5.9 million
barrels that year to 16.2 million barrels in 1947 and almost 400
million barrels in 1955, in tandem with the development of other
oil fields [112]. Within five years – 1945 to  1949 – the Kuwaiti oil
industry was transformed from one dependent on five gallon bar-
rels being distributed manually to customers, carried on camels,
donkeys, or wooden push carts to  one characterized by huge vol-
umes and scale economies that were dependent on motorized
trucks and tankers, pipelines, and filling stations [113].
Simultaneously, Kuwait began using oil  for  electricity gener-
ation. The Kuwait Oil Company obtained and commissioned its
first 500 kW generator in  1951 and in  1952 built a  2.25 MW  Steam
Power Station at Al-Shewaikh, essentially tripling national electric-
ity capacity in three years [114]. Demand for such electricity grew
considerably, doubling again by 1960 and then increasing (in per
capita terms) from about 1500 kWh  to more than 9200 kWh  in 1985
[115]. Thereafter a  rapid expansion of distillation units, refiner-
ies, petrol stations, and the establishment of the Kuwait National
Petroleum Company in  1960, the same year Kuwait helped form
the  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, saw oil’s rise
continue so that in 1965 Kuwait became the world’s fourth largest
producer of oil (behind the United States, USSR, and Venezuela, and
ahead of Saudi Arabia) [81]. As  even energy transition skeptic Smil
concedes, “in energy terms Kuwait thus moved from a  pre-modern
society dependent on imports of wood, charcoal, and kerosene to
an oil superpower in  a  single generation [81]”.
The Netherlands—thanks in  large part to the discovery of a giant
Groningen natural gas field in 1959—started a rapid transition away
from oil and coal to  natural gas [81]. That year, coal supplied about
55% of Dutch primary energy supply followed by crude oil at 43%
and natural gas less than 2%. In December 1965, however, one year
after gas deliveries began from Groningen, natural gas supplied 5%
of the Netherland’s primary energy, rising quickly to 50% by 1971.
To facilitate the transition, the government decided in December
1965 to abandon all coal mining in the Limburg province within a
decade, doing away with some 75,000 mining related jobs impact-
ing more than 200,000 people. What made the transition successful
was that the government strategically steered it [116],  implement-
ing countermeasures such as subsidies for new businesses, the
relocation of government industries from the capital to regions of
the country hardest hit by the mine closures, retraining programs
for miners, and offering shares in  Groningen to Staatsmijnen (the
state mining company). After its peak output in  the mid-1970s,
extraction of gas at Groningen was  purposely scaled back to maxi-
mize the lifetime of the field, though natural gas continued to  play
a  prominent role in  the nation’s energy mix. In 2010, for instance,
natural gas still provided 45% of total primary energy supply, larger
than any other source [117].
The French transition to nuclear power was  also swift. Following
the oil crisis in  1974, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer announced a
large nuclear power program intended to generate all of France’s
electricity from nuclear reactors to  displace the Republic’s heavy
dependence on imported oil. As the maxim went at the time, “No
coal, no oil, no gas, no choice! [95]”. The “Messmer Plan” proposed
the construction of 80 nuclear power plants by 1985 and 170 plants
by 2000. Work commenced on three plants – Tricastin, Gravelines,
and Dampierre – immediately following the announcement of the
plan and France ended up constructing 56 reactors from 1974 to
1989. As a  result, nuclear power grew from 4%  of national elec-
tricity supply in 1970 to 10% in 1978 and almost 40% by 1982. As
Grubler has noted, “the reasons for this success lay in  a  unique
institutional setting allowing centralized decision-making, regula-
tory stability, dedicated efforts for standardized reactor designs and
a powerful nationalized utility, EDF, whose substantial in-house
engineering resources enabled it to  act as principal and agent of
reactor construction simultaneously [118]”.
Though Denmark is  perhaps more famous for a  transition to
wind energy, a  far  more accelerated transition occurred in  the
1970s and 1980s. This transition involved two sets of changes, from
oil to  coal as a  fuel for electricity and from individual to  district
heating in heating. Before 1974, almost all heating in Denmark
was provided by fuel oil, which meant the oil crisis had particu-
larly painful impacts on the country’s economy [119].  The Danish
Energy Policy of 1976 therefore articulated the short-term goal of
reducing oil dependence, and it stated the importance also of build-
ing a  “diversified supply system” and meeting two-thirds of total
heat consumption with “collective heat supply” by  2002. More-
over, it sought to reduce oil dependence to 20%, an ambitious goal
that involved the conversion of 800,000 individual oil boilers from
natural gas and coal. In a  mere five years – from 1976 to  1981 –
Danish electricity production changed from 90% oil-based to  95%
coal-based. Stipulations in  favor of combined heat and power (CHP)
were further strengthened by the 1979 Heat Supply Act, whose
purpose was to “promote the best national economic use of  energy
for heated buildings and supplying them with hot water and to
reduce the country’s dependence on mineral oil”. As a result, CHP
production increased from trivial amounts in  1970 to supply 61%
of national electricity and 77% of the country’s district heating in
2010.2
A final example is  intriguing because rather than transitioning
towards something, it involves transitioning away. In  2003, the gov-
ernment of Ontario committed to retiring all coal-fired electricity
generation by 2007, something they did accomplish, albeit a  few
years behind schedule. Ontario’s oldest coal plant, the 1140 MW
Lakeview facility, was closed in April 2005 followed by  sequential
closures of Thunder Bay (306 MW),  Atikokan (211 MW),  Lambton
(1972 MW),  and Nanticoke (3945 MW)  from 2007 to 2014. Coal
generation thus declined from 25% of provincial supply in  2003 to
15% in  2008, 3% in 2011, and 0% in  2014. The primary justification
2 As an  aside, national planners managed a third transition, away from coal, in the
1990s,  when the Danish parliament passed the “coal stop,” functionally outlawing
the  construction of new coal fired power stations, with exceptions given only to  two
450 MW plants.
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for the closure, apart from its obvious climate change benefits, was
public health. A government study estimated that  shifting away
from coal would reduce some 330,000 related illnesses and more
than 700 deaths related to coal pollution to fewer than 6 deaths and
only 2460 illnesses. Put into monetary terms, the “coal switch” was
estimated to save $4.4 billion per year in  health, environmental,
and financial damages along with $95 million in displaced operat-
ing and maintenance costs [120].  To achieve this transition, Ontario
invested more than $21 billion in cleaner sources of energy includ-
ing wind, hydroelectricity, solar, and nuclear power, as well as
$11 billion in transmission and distribution upgrades and other
investments in energy efficiency [121].  Ontario is on track to  see
renewable sources of electricity grow to  46%  of supply by 2025,
and typical residential customers are expected to save $520 on their
bills, and large industrial customers to  save $3 million each on their
bills, from 2013 to 2017 [121].
3.3. Re-conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of future
transitions
The ten examples above—five covering prime movers, five cov-
ering changes in supply—do cast some doubt on  mainstream
conceptions that transitions must invariably take decades to occur.
Indeed, although previous, historical transitions may  have taken a
great deal of time, the argument runs that we have learned a  suf-
ficient amount from them so that contemporary, or future, energy
transitions can be expedited. Future transitions may  also become
a social or political priority in ways that previous transitions have
not been—that is, previous transitions may  have been accidental
or circumstantial, whereas future transitions could become more
planned and coordinated, or backed by aggressive social move-
ments or progressive government targets. This section of the paper
discusses three significant drivers behind the possibility of accel-
erated future transitions: scarcity, climate change, and innovation.
First, unlike earlier transitions driven primarily by price or an
abundance of resources, future ones may  be driven by  scarcity
and the unaffordability of resources. Consider crude oil. Sorrel
et al. examined oil field-size, reserve growth and decline rates, and
depletion rates for the entire industry [122]. They concluded that,
as a global average:
The (reserve diminishment) rate of post-peak fields is at least
6.5%/year and the corresponding decline rate of all currently pro-
ducing fields is at least 4%/year. Both are on an upward trend
as more giant fields enter decline, as production shifts towards
smaller, younger and offshore fields and as  changing production
methods lead to more rapid post-peak decline. More than two thirds
of current crude oil production capacity may need to be replaced
by 2030, simply to keep production constant. At best, this is likely
to prove extremely challenging.
Numerous other studies suggest that resource peaks are immi-
nent, if not already present. One assessment of the “most likely
scenarios” estimated that global oil production peaked in  2015,
that natural gas production would peak in  2035, and that coal
production would peak in 2052—forming the bell-shaped curves
in production illustrated by Fig. 5 [123].  Similar peaks in  supply
have been confirmed by  multiple, independent analyses under-
taken by some of the world’s best geologists, economists, and
energy analysts for oil and natural gas [124–128],  coal [129–136],
and even uranium [137,138]. British Petroleum, hardly a  source
biased against fossil fuels, estimated in  2014 that global reserve to
production ratios for oil, natural gas and coal were 53.3 years, 55.1
years and 113 years, respectively [139].
Even if such peaks in supply are exaggerated or uncertain,
there is also the possibility of peaks in  demand—of demand-driven
scarcity. Put another way,  “demand peaks” can quickly exert change
Fig. 5. Projected Global Peaks in Production for Oil, Gas, and Coal, 1850–2250.
Source: Ref. [140]
on “supply-side” energy technologies, altering their configurations
in ways unheard of before. Many studies support such a  contention
about rapid shifts in demand for fossil fuels. One research team,
for instance, predicted that  the inflated prices for petroleum that
are expected this century could practically bankrupt the iron, fertil-
izer, and air transport industries [141]. Citi Bank, a  global financial
firm, declared in  2013 that global oil  demand was  “approaching a
tipping point” and that “the end is nigh” for growth due to  substi-
tution trends of natural gas for oil coupled with improvements in
the fuel economy of vehicles [142].
Second, speedy future transitions may  be necessary to avoid the
social and environmental costs stemming from unabated climate
change. This second major driver relates to environmental carrying
capacity limits. Whether we choose to  acknowledge it or not, pro-
ponents of this view hold that humanity must undertake economic
activities subject to a “carbon budget.” At a  certain level of green-
house gas emissions, we  cannot afford to utilize more fossil fuels,
even if they were free [143]. As Hansen and his  colleagues have
noted, “Burning all fossil fuels would produce a  different, practi-
cally uninhabitable, planet [144]”. Thus, many barrels of  oil, cubic
meters of natural gas, and tons of coal will need to  stay in the ground
as “stranded assets [145,146]”. One study examined the volumes
of oil that “cannot be used” by 2035 due to carbon restraints and
projected that 500–600 billion barrels must be “unburnable” and
that 40–55% of new deep-water resources must not be developed
[147]. Even if geologic or economic peaks were avoidable, these
folks argue, the threat of climate change forces a  retreat from fossil
fuel consumption [126]–it requires a fast, and eventually complete
transition.
Third, technological learning and innovation can result in
new technologies and systems with the potential for exponential
growth. Former United States Vice President Al Gore encapsulated
this type of thinking when he argued, in  2008, that “today I chal-
lenge our nation to  commit to producing 100% of our electricity
from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within
10 years [148]”. Gore went on to say that a  complete change in
energy production was  “achievable, affordable and transformative”
within the course of one decade. His thinking rested on the assump-
tion that innovations in both technology and policy design can
accelerate technological change, and achieve an energy transition,
in ways not  possible even just a  few decades ago.
For example, previous transitions such as that from wood to
coal or coal to oil occurred without the accumulation of knowl-
edge we have currently about the sociology, politics, and economics
of energy transitions, i.e., without the complex historical analyses
conducted by the likes of Smil, Grubler, Wilson, Hughes, and Fou-
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quet. Because we now possess this knowledge, we  can apply it going
forward to minimize the unnecessary lag or delay of a future energy
transition. Even Fouquet and Perason write that “past energy tran-
sitions may  not be the best analogies for a  future low carbon energy
transition [149]”. Why? In part, we now possess better knowl-
edge about the co-benefits of low-carbon supply including less
air  pollution and improved public health, economic diversification,
and enhanced national competitiveness [150–152].  We have bet-
ter causal models and analysis of how transitions occur and are
beginning to establish methodologies and policy prescriptions for
how to manage future transitions [153–157].  We  now have newly
developed policy mechanisms such as production tax credits, feed-
in tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards that can hasten the
adoption of preferred technologies [158]. And, many newer energy
technologies can provide multiple energy services at once, such
as microhydro dams (which can provide mechanical energy for
agricultural processing, electricity, and irrigation simultaneously)
[159], TEG cookstoves (which can provide both heat for cooking and
small amounts of electricity) [160] or tri-generation (electric gen-
erators that can provide electricity, heat, and cooling at the same
time) [161]. Each of these new systems can replace two  or  three
previously distinct devices, and operate more like general purpose
technologies.
For these reasons, perhaps future energy transitions, because
they can draw on synergistic advances in multiple domains at
once—cutting across multiplicity of energy services, materials
science, computing, combustion dynamics, gasification, nanotech-
nology, biological and genetic engineering, 3D printing and the
industrial internet—can truly be accelerated in  ways that past tran-
sitions have (generally) not been, despite the fact that it may  be
scarcity or concerns about climate change, rather than abundance
or price, driving them. “Accelerated diffusion” can become the
norm, not the exception.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
This final part of the paper offers four conclusions for energy
analysts and practitioners.
First, at a basic level, whether an energy transition can occur
quickly or slowly can depend in  great deal about how it is defined.
Some core definitional issues include:
• Different interpretations of “significant”. Significance may  pre-
sume large absolute magnitude or share with respect to a
particular energy sector (narrow such as cooking and household
electricity, or new commercial lighting systems, or broad such
as entire energy supply or all buildings). Significance can also be
subjective, with good social science usually asking “significant for
whom?”;
• Different interpretation of “in a  society”. This may  refer to the
world as a whole, a  group of countries, one country (small or
large), part of a  country (Ontario) or a  particular segment of pop-
ulation (e.g. low-income peasants in China, new car purchasers
in Brazil, office workers in Sweden);
• Different interpretations of “resources, carriers, converters and
services”. Many historic analyses of energy transitions looked
for situations when all of these were significantly affected (e.g.
substituting coal with oil affected not only the type of miner-
als being extracted, but also distribution infrastructure, refining,
types of vehicles and engines, mobility patterns of population
heating, electricity generation, urban development, etc.). In con-
trast, switching from kerosene to LPG in  Indonesia had a  much
more confined effect on resources, carriers, converters and ser-
vices. Switching to  FFVs in  Brazil did not affect services and
converters (FFVs have a  similar engine) and may  or may  not  affect
resources or carriers (depending on whether people fill their FFVs
with conventional fuel or alcohol).3
Such definitional assumptions and demarcations are not always
clear in  the academic literature, yet they are  important, for they
capture how transitions are framed and also propagated rhetori-
cally to the public [162].
Second, timing of a  transition can be subjective. Sometimes the
“speed” at which an energy transition occurs has less to do with
what actually happened and more to  do  with what or when one
counts [163].  The American transition to oil, according to Smil, took
about 80 years to reach a  25% share, yet during the most acceler-
ated phase of that transition—from 1990 to 1925—oil grew from
2.4% of national energy supply to 24%, justifying those who would
call it “quick [164]”. For air conditioning, whether one takes the
time of first conception (Nikola Tesla developed electric motors that
made possible the invention of oscillating fans in 1885), first inven-
tion (Willis Carrier invented the first modern system in 1902), or
first successful commercial application (when Henry Galson devel-
oped an affordable mass produced system in  1947) greatly alters
the perceived rate of market penetration [165]. Brazil’s transition
to  flex-fuel vehicles, arguably, took a  year (from the start of  the
national program to large-scale diffusion), more than twenty years
(from the first invention of a FFV in 1980), almost thirty years (from
the start of their national ethanol program), or more than eight
decades (from the first invention of a Brazilian engine capable of
using ethanol in the 1920s).
In the case of national transitions, we  see similar ambiguity.
Kuwait’s transition to oil can be said to  have begun in  1934, with
the first concession given to the Kuwait Oil Company; or in 1937,
when the first exploratory wells were drilled in  the Burgan field;
or in 1946, when commercial production began (the starting point
taken here); or even in  1949, when the first refinery was estab-
lished. Similarly the French nuclear power program could have
defensibly begun in  1942 with the first chain reaction under the
Manhattan project; or in 1945, with the formation of the Commis-
sariat à  l’Énergie Atomique; or in  1948, when their first research
reactor was commissioned; or  in 1974 with the launch of  the Mess-
mer  Plan (taken here). Deciding what one counts includes within
it normative assumptions about what an energy transition is;  the
problem is that analysts do  not  always make these assumptions
transparent.
Third, adding to the difficulty of defining and dating them,
energy transitions are complex, and irreducible to  a  single cause,
factor, or blueprint. They can be influenced by endogenous fac-
tors within a  country, like aggressive planning in China, Denmark,
Indonesia, the Netherlands, Ontario or Sweden, intensified by  polit-
ical will and stakeholder involvement, or exogenous factors outside
of a country, such as military conflict (the World Wars spawning the
French nuclear program, their cessation enabling Kuwait to  invest
in oil  fields), a major energy accident (Chernobyl, Fukushima), or
some global crisis (the oil shocks of the 1970s, the collapse of
communism in the early 1990s, climate change today). Other tran-
sitions, such as the adoption of air conditioning, can be almost
entirely market driven. Some can offer financial or social benefits
to early adopters—cooler homes for the owners of air  condition-
ing, improved health for cookstove users, savings at the pump for
FFV drivers—whereas others (such as nuclear power in  France, oil in
Kuwait, and natural gas in the Netherlands) primarily diffused their
benefits to governments and private corporate actors in the form
of economic rents. Put another way, some transitions were quick
3 Also, the Brazilian case is rather incremental technological substitution rather
than systemic change towards a more sustainable transport system involving walk-
ing, cycling, integration of multi-modal forms of transport, and so on.
212 B.K. Sovacool /  Energy Research & Social Science 13 (2016) 202–215
because they were managed or  incentivized; others were more
naturally occurring as a function of changes in technology, price,
or consumer demand. Some benefited homeowners or  consumers,
others benefitted corporations or governments.
This makes each of the ten rapid case studies examined unique
and context dependent. Some were about discrete artifacts (e.g.
stoves, air conditioners, cars), which are perhaps easier to  diffuse
than entire systems. Quite a  few are in  small countries: Denmark,
Kuwait, the Netherlands, Ontario and Sweden. Many have special
governance characteristics: communist China, Brazil under mili-
tary dictatorship, Sweden with a  corporatist economy, Denmark
and its socialist communes, and centrally planned France. Some
were based on special natural resource discoveries: natural gas in
Denmark and the Netherlands, oil in Kuwait, wind, solar and hydro
potential in Ontario. Each case has certain specificities that help
explain the rapidity of transition.
The implication here is that energy transitions have no magic
formula. The United Kingdom, for instance, had the same access to
natural gas that the Netherlands did, yet it was unable to  cultivate
the  same type of changeover [81]. Countries throughout the Asia-
Pacific have access to the same LPG stove technology that exists in
Indonesia but have not seen widespread adoption [166]. The expe-
rience of tiny, affluent countries such as Denmark and Kuwait may
be relevant for countries in  a similar class (such as Belgium, Brunei,
or Qatar), but less so for an India or Nigeria. Moreover, the sociocul-
tural or political conditions behind transitions in Brazil and China,
at  the time military dictatorships and communist regimes (respec-
tively), are incompatible with the governance norms espoused in
modern democracies across Europe and North America. Further-
more, history seems to suggest that  past transitions—including
many of the case studies presented here—are based on discoveries
of new, significant, and affordable forms of energy (usually carbon-
intensive) or technology, leading to abundance. Yet in  the future,
it may  be scarcity and “stranded assets,” rather than abundance,
which influences decisions [167].
Fourth, and lastly, is that given these attributes of complexity,
timing, and causality, most energy transitions have been, and will
likely continue to be, path dependent rather than revolutionary,
cumulative rather than fully substitutive. To use parlance from the
multilevel perspective and sociotechnical transitions theory, niches
will only rarely evolve to completely dominate a landscape. Older
sources of energy—such as muscle power, animate power, wood
power, and steam power—still remain in use throughout the world
today, they have not entirely been replaced by  fossil, nuclear, and
modern renewable energy [168,169]. Grubler himself writes that
“In fact, a new solution does not evolve in  a  vacuum but interacts
with existing practices and technologies [37]”. One analyst at MIT
commented that “we’ll use renewable energy more as technology
makes it cheaper, but we’re likely to keep using more of the other
sources of energy, too [170]”. The motorized automobile behind
(in part) the transition to  oil in  Kuwait and FFVs in Brazil is actually
a consolidation of earlier inventions fused together: the internal
combustion engine, the wheel, the casting of steel, electric lights,
tires, the assembly line, and so on. The CHP, biomass, wind, and solar
technology behind the transitions in  Denmark and Ontario have
benefitted from advances in the fossil-fuel chain including com-
bined cycle turbines, batteries, and compressed air energy storage.
Thus, transitions often appear not as an exponential line on a
graph, but as a punctuated equilibrium which dips and rises. Fast
transitions have occurred and are capable of occurring, but they
only become apparent when one carefully adheres to  a  particular
notion of significance, society, energy resources, and energy ser-
vices, and then appreciates contextual specificity. Future energy
studies, forecasts, and scenarios ought to make these attributes
much more transparent and explicit.
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